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Abstract 
We examine the profitability, entry deterrence and welfare effects of proliferation offered by 
non-cooperative firms competing in quality and price. In a market of one high quality firm and 
competitive low quality firms, we find that the established high quality firm will not initiate 
proliferation but may have an incentive to do so if facing entry threats. The proliferation 
quality is endogenously determined and the industry profits decrease with such proliferation. 
Moreover, we show that proliferation increases consumer surplus in the same way as entry 
does. That is, while proliferation to deter entry is anti-competitive, it is not necessarily welfare-
reducing.  
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1 Introduction 
In vertically differentiated markets with products of the same generic type, firms making 
quality-price decisions face a trade-off between softening competition and broadening market 
segments. As a result, proliferation or multi-product strategy (see, e.g., Constantatos and 
Perrakis, 1997), with which firms typically offer a range of products, could have either 
procompetitive or anticompetitive effects. On the one hand, by filling in the gaps on a quality 
spectrum, proliferation increases competition as products available become less differentiated. 
On the other hand, proliferation enables firms to reach different market segments and better 
discriminate against consumers.  
Ever since Schmalensee (1978) suggests empirically that an incumbent can preempt entry 
by introducing new products and restricting the market space available to potential entrants, 
there has been increasing antitrust concerns against excessive proliferation. If one tries to 
rationalize firms’ engagement in proliferation that is not per se profitable, the argument might 
be that it is optimal if some other considerations are taken into account, e.g., entry deterrence.  
Proliferation to deter entry has been under intense investigation in horizontal 
differentiation settings (Judd, 1985; Choi and Scarpa, 1991; Murooka, 2012), but the same 
analysis in vertical settings is sparse. Given that excessive proliferation is suspicious, one may 
tempt to assume that moderate proliferation is more likely to be justified on profitability 
ground thus seemingly causes no harm. In this paper, we show that it is possible for vertical 
proliferation to be completely undesirable in the absence of entry threats, even in the extreme 
case of introducing only one additional quality. Therefore proliferation of any level might 
involve anticompetitive purpose. More interestingly, when proliferation is optimal given entry 
threats, it always benefits consumers.  
In a vertically differentiated market, suppose that consumers have identical ordinal 
preferences over product quality and differ only in income levels.1 Then at an equal price, 
                                                             
1 Another interpretation of vertical differentiation is by Mussa and Rosen (1978) where consumers differ only in 
their intensity of preference for quality. The two interpretations are related; if 𝜃 is a parameter of intensity of 
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higher quality is preferable. For example, people would generally agree that a Mason Pearson 
hairbrush is preferable to a hairbrush from Primark.2 In a simple duopoly market, a series of 
papers (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1992) 
prove the existence of a unique quality-price equilibrium in which two established firms follow 
the Principle of Maximal Differentiation. That is, they first choose distinct qualities and then 
set distinct prices, so as to dampen competition and increase profits.  
It is also common for a single firm to offer quality-differentiated products to consumers. 
For example, for a given size, Mason Pearson usually offers three types of hairbrush, namely 
pure bristle, bristle/nylon, and nylon, where bristle is finer and more expensive than nylon as 
the component of a hairbrush head. Another form of proliferation, namely brands collaboration, 
is usually conducted jointly by two firms. Similar to a joint venture strategy, brands 
collaboration is defined by Chun and Niehm (2010) as a strategic and cooperative relationship 
where brands devote their own competitive advantages to present products under joint names 
to consumers.  
A good example of vertical brands collaboration is the high-street brands (e.g. Gap and 
H&M) and luxury brands (e.g. Jimmy Choo and Lanvin) collaborations in the fashion apparel 
and sportswear industry. The premier case was by Puma and Jil Sander in the late 1990s. Chun 
and Niehm (2010) suggest that through this collaboration, “the boundaries between genres 
collapsed.” In 2003, Adidas launched its first collaborations with designer brands Stella 
McCartney and Jeremy Scott. Puma collaborated with Neil Barrett and Alexander McQueen 
in subsequent years. Nike joined the trend in 2012 and has been collaborating with Liberty.   
A more typical case has been the Sweden based clothing retailer Hennes & Mauritz 
(H&M). In 2004, H&M tied up with Karl Lagerfeld and produced a successful collection. 
Since then, it has launched 21 collaborations with 16 different designer brands.3 The average 
                                                             
preference for quality, then wealthier consumers have a higher 𝜃 and enjoy quality improvement more that less 
wealthy consumers (See, e.g., Tirole, 1988; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1992). 
2 See http://masonpearson.co.uk/ and http://www.primark.com/en/search/categorised search?q=hairbrush.  
3 Collaborations in the last decade included those with Stella McCartney, Viktor & Rolf, Roberto Cavalli, Comme 
des Garcons, Marimekko, Matthew Williamson, Jimmy Choo, Sonia Rykiel, Lanvin, Versace, Marni, Anna Dello 
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prices of items from H&M collaborations were over £100, with the most expensive 
collaboration so far being Maison Martin Margiela for H&M (on average £141.61 per item). 
Despite at much higher prices compared to normal H&M ranges, the collaboration ranges were 
sold out quickly. Some popular pieces were sold on eBay for five times the original prices. 
Meanwhile, the prices were lower than the original luxury collections. As reflected by prices, 
the perceived quality of collaborated ranges seems to be higher than the normal ranges from 
the high-street stores, although would not be as high as the original designer collections. As a 
result, quality configuration expands with such joint proliferation. 
It is of importance to study proliferation in vertically differentiated markets since the 
existing studies relating to it is limited and does not keep up pace with the boom of the real 
world (joint) proliferation cases. Among many strategic incentives, proliferation has mainly 
been examined for two – to increase profit and to deter entry. While there is a literature on the 
optimality of proliferation (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982), the specific conditions and 
endogenous proliferation qualities have been largely unaddressed, leaving it difficult to 
evaluate proliferation even in a simple framework. Since the entry deterrence effect of 
proliferation in vertical differentiation settings is rarely examined, the relevant welfare effects 
remain unclear.4 
Although fully replicating the real world high-street and luxury collaborations is beyond 
the scope of this paper, we wish to examine how proliferation works in a context that captures 
this sort of competition. In the absence of entry threats, common expectation of firms on 
proliferation is to broaden market segments. Whether such expectation can be fulfilled is 
unclear without knowing how firms wish to locate the additional qualities.  
Furthermore, when a firm makes decisions regarding proliferation, it faces a menu of 
options of how much control it wishes to take. For example, it may wish to take full control 
over the quality-price decision of any additional product introduced; or any additional product 
                                                             
Russo, Maison Martin Margiela, Isabel Marant and Alexander Wang. See http://about.hm.com/en/About/facts-
about-hm/people-and-history/history.html. 
4 There is a much richer strand of literature on “limit quality” to deter entry (e.g., Lane, 1980; Donnenfeld and 
Weber, 1995; Noh and Moschini, 2006) than proliferation to deter entry in vertical differentiation model. 
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acts as an independent unit that decides its own quality and price, while the parent-firm acts 
as a shareholder collecting profit from it (i.e., divisionalisation in Baye, Crocker and Ju, 1996).  
Immediately the message is that an entrant would make the same quality-price decision as an 
independent unit, as the independent unit seeks to maximise its own profit instead of the total 
profits of its parent-firm.  
In a model of maximal differentiation where one firm specializes at the high end of the 
quality spectrum and Bertrand competitive firms operate at the low end, we show that the high 
quality firm would only be able to locate a middle quality product if it allows that product to 
be an independent unit. The quality level of the middle quality product is endogenously 
determined and is a convex combination of the existing high and low qualities. To be specific, 
it is 4/7 of that of the high quality product plus 3/7 of that of the low quality product. The price 
of the middle quality product is 2/7 of the price of the high quality product.5 Such proliferation 
is not optimal in the absence of entry threats but becomes optimal in the presence of entry 
threats, when the proliferation cost is sufficiently small.  
Moving from the two-quality to the three-quality market, if the fixed cost of introducing 
the third quality is small enough, then the rise in consumer surplus would outweigh the fall in 
industry profits, hence total welfare increases. Such increase in welfare could be achieved by 
the high quality firm through proliferation, or by the entrant if proliferation does not take place. 
From the welfare point of view, whether the outcome is achieved more efficiently by the 
established firm or by the entrant depends on their relative cost of introducing the third product. 
If the high quality firm benefits from the fact that it is already established hence incur lower 
cost, then not only proliferation can increase welfare, it also does in a way that is more efficient 
than entry. 
The setting considered in this paper is along the similar lines to Tirole (1988), who 
provides an intuitive yet simple way to solve the model of vertical differentiation. We allow 
                                                             
5 This is superficially similar to Choi and Shin (1992)’s results in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation with 
uncovered market. They find that the quality level of the low quality product is 4/7 of that of the high quality 
product, and the price of the low quality product is 2/7 of the price of the high quality product. However, in this 
paper, we have an additional middle quality product. 
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competitive firms in the low quality segment, which is different from the standard duopoly 
model. This modification, however, is consistent with the distribution of differentiated brands 
in the real world. For example, in the fashion apparel industry, there are countless high-street 
brands and far fewer designer luxury brands. Although it is a simplified model, it delivers a 
comprehensive evaluation of the proliferation strategy. 
This paper is close in spirit to Baye et al. (1996), who study firms’ incentives to add 
divisions before engaging in Cournot competition. They suggest that the profit generated by a 
new division may be offset by the fall in the profit of the parent-firm’s existing units. Therefore 
proliferation, however moderate, might fail to fulfil the expectation. 
The idea on proliferation location is close to Donnenfeld and Weber (1992), who show in 
a model of maximal differentiation that a later entrant always selects an intermediate level of 
quality. But the intermediate quality is not endogenously determined and they do not consider 
the situation where the intermediate quality is offered by an incumbent. Our result on the 
quality level of the middle quality product is consistent with the prediction of Choi and Shin 
(1992), who suggest it to be “just over half that of the established firm”.  
While Constantatos and Perrakis (1997) also find that proliferation may help an 
established firm to block entry, their focus is on market coverage. In our model, market 
coverage is endogenously full with or without proliferation. Proliferation intensifies price 
competition and reallocates demand: in the presence of the middle quality product, price of 
the high quality product decreases and demand increases, whereas demand for the low quality 
product drops significantly.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model for our analysis. Section 2.1 
provides a two-quality market environment in which one high quality firm and competitive 
low quality firms compete in price. We characterize the equilibrium as a benchmark for 
assessing proliferation incentives later. Section 2.2 evaluates the profitability of proliferation 
in the existing two-quality market without threat of entry. We determine endogenously the 
quality choice of proliferation. Section 2.3 examines proliferation as a deterrent when there is 
threat of entry. Section 3 presents welfare analysis. Section 4 concludes.   
7 
 
2 Model 
2.1 Two-quality environment 
In a market of quality-differentiated products of the same generic type. Product 𝑖  is of 
quality 𝑠𝑖  and is sold at price 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}, where 𝑠ℎ > 𝑠𝑙  and 𝑝ℎ > 𝑝𝑙 . Products with high 
quality 𝑠ℎ are provided by a single firm, 𝐻, and products with low quality 𝑠𝑙 are provided by 
at least two firms, 𝐿1 and 𝐿2. 𝐻 and the low quality segment engage in maximal differentiation: 
𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑙 are fixed at the two ends of the quality spectrum. The difference between 𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑙 
is denoted as 𝑑 and is therefore the total length of the spectrum. The unit cost of production 𝑐 
is assumed to be the same for both qualities and is normalized to zero. We assume for now 
that there is no threat of entry. 
There is a continuum of consumers who have identical ordinal preferences over product 
quality but differ in the willingness to pay. They are uniformly distributed over the interval 
[0, 𝜃] where 𝜃 represents their willingness to pay. Each consumer consumes at most one unit 
of the products and maximises the following utility function 
𝑈 = {
𝜃𝑠𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠,
0,                 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
                                                                                                 (1) 
The last consumer with the willingness to pay for the high quality product and the low 
quality product, is represented by 𝜃ℎ = (𝑝ℎ − 𝑝𝑙)/𝑑 and 𝜃𝑙 = 𝑝𝑙/𝑠𝑙 , respectively. That is, 
consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃ℎ, ?̅?] buy the high quality products, consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙, 𝜃ℎ) buy 
the low quality products and consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [0, 𝜃𝑙) buy neither of them.   
As 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 offer products with the identical quality 𝑠𝑙 , the Bertrand (1883) paradox 
leads to Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1 Price competition drives 𝑝𝑙 down to zero. All consumers purchase at least one of 
the products and the market is covered. 
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For 𝐻, we can write the optimisation problem as 
max
𝑝ℎ
 𝜋𝐻 =max
𝑝ℎ
 𝑝ℎ(𝜃 − 𝜃ℎ),                                                                                                 
where 𝜃 − 𝜃ℎ is the demand for high quality product. To solve this optimisation problem, we 
derive the first-order condition with respect to 𝑝ℎ and obtain 
𝑝ℎ =  𝜃𝑑/2 + 𝑝𝑙/2, 
𝐷ℎ =  𝜃𝑑 + 𝑝𝑙/2𝑑. 
Together with Lemma 1, we have the following  
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, high and low quality products equally share the market; 𝐷ℎ = 𝐷𝑙 =
 𝜃/2. H sets 𝑝ℎ =  𝜃𝑑/2 and obtains 𝜋𝐻 = ?̅?
2𝑑/4, whereas 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 obtain zero profit. 
Lemma 2 explains firms’ price decisions in the vertically differentiated market. Given that 
𝑑  is constant, the price of the high quality product is higher when the distribution of 
willingness to pay 𝜃 is more dispersed. The market is equally and fully covered by the two 
existing qualities. Unlike the standard non-cooperative duopoly vertical differentiation model 
where both high and low quality firms enjoy positive surplus, price competition among 
products of quality 𝑠𝑙 in our model leaves no surplus for the low quality segment.  
 
2.2 Proliferation environment  
This section examines 𝐻’s incentive to proliferate in the existing two-quality market. Since 
moderate proliferation is more likely to be justified on profitability ground, we allow 𝐻 to 
introduce exactly one additional quality, 𝑠𝑚, and assume that  
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𝑠𝑚 = 𝛽𝑠𝑙 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑠ℎ , 𝛽 ∈ (0,1). 
The above assumption ensures that 𝑠𝑚 is of an intermediate level, where 𝛽 is the location 
parameter. Given that 𝑠ℎ  and 𝑠𝑙  are exogenous, 𝛽 decides  𝑠𝑚 . When 𝛽 > 0.5, 𝑠𝑚 is closer 
to 𝑠𝑙 than to 𝑠ℎ. We exclude the possibility of equality among qualities which is not profitable 
for 𝐻. 
Figure 1 illustrates how proliferation may change the market. We know from Lemmata 1 
and 2 that in the market with two qualities 𝑠𝑙 and 𝑠ℎ, all consumers will purchase. Consumers 
with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃ℎ)  buy products of  𝑠𝑙  and consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃ℎ, ?̅?]  buy products of  𝑠ℎ . 
When products of 𝑠𝑚 are introduced to the market, as shown by the dashed line in Figure 1, 
consumers face three choices instead of two. Ceteris paribus, consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃𝑚) 
buy products of 𝑠𝑙, consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑚, 𝜃ℎ
′) buy products of 𝑠𝑚, and consumers with 𝜃 ∈
[𝜃ℎ
′, ?̅?] buy products of 𝑠ℎ. 
  
Figure 1 Proliferation in the two-quality market 
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Johnson and Myatt (2003) suggest that when established firms strategically expand on the 
quality spectrum, they usually do so by introducing a lower quality product.6 As 𝑠ℎ > 𝑠𝑚 >
𝑠𝑙, we have 𝐻, rather than one of the low quality firms, to offer 𝑠𝑚. Linking it to the real world, 
reputation of the designer brands seems to be the key factor contributing to the success of 
H&M’s collaborated ranges. Since in the scope of this paper, proliferation is to be conducted 
by a single firm, not jointly, it can only be credibly conducted by 𝐻. 𝐻 will proliferate by 
introducing a middle quality to avoid fierce local competition with the existing qualities, as 
also suggested by Donnenfeld and Weber (1992). 
Upon proliferation, 𝐻 has to incur some fixed cost 𝑓, which may be seen as a product-
specific-capital, but the unit cost of production is again normalized to zero. Proliferation works 
like this: first 𝛽 is chosen and then all three quality products engage in price competition. As 
there are two decisions to be made regarding the middle quality product, quality location and 
price,  𝐻 faces options of how much control it wishes to take upon proliferation.  
 a. Full Control b. Semi-full Control c. Independent Control 
𝜷 is decided by 𝐻 𝐻 Middle quality as an 
independent unit 
𝒑𝒎 is decided by 𝐻 Middle quality as an 
independent unit 
Middle quality as an 
independent unit 
Table 1 Control options of proliferation 
As shown in Table 1, 𝐻 can choose from three control options. We specify below the 
optimisation problem of  𝐻 with each option respectively. 
a. Full Control 
max
 𝛽,𝑝ℎ,𝑝𝑚
𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = max
𝛽,𝑝ℎ,𝑝𝑚
[𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚 − 𝑓].                                                                                            (2) 
                                                             
6 They provide an example from the Indian watch market in which a launch of a high-end brand by a low-end firm 
was unsuccessful and eventually exited the market. 
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With this option, 𝐻 takes full control over proliferation. It sets the quality location and 
price of the middle quality product, as well as the price of the original high quality product, so 
as to jointly maximise its total proliferation profits, 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜
.  
b. Semi-full Control  
max
𝛽
 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = max 
𝛽
[(max
𝑝ℎ
 𝜋ℎ +max
𝑝𝑚
 𝜋𝑚) − 𝑓],                                                                    (3) 
where 
max
𝑝ℎ
 𝜋ℎ = max
𝑝ℎ
 𝑝ℎ𝐷ℎ   
max
𝑝𝑚
 𝜋𝑚 = max
𝑝𝑚
 𝑝𝑚𝐷𝑚
}.                                                                                                         (4) 
With this option, 𝐻  sets the location of the middle quality product to maximise total 
proliferation profits, but does not interfere into price competition. 𝑝ℎ and 𝑝𝑚 are chosen to 
maximise respective unit profits. 
c. Independent Control 
𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = max𝜋ℎ
𝑝ℎ
+max 𝜋𝑚 − 𝑓
𝛽,𝑝𝑚
.                                                                                               (5) 
With this option, the middle quality product acts purely as an independent unit and has 
freedom to decide its quality location as well as price, whereas 𝐻 acts as the parent-firm of the 
middle quality product and collects the profit that it generates.  
To determine whether 𝐻 has an incentive to proliferate and which control option it will 
choose, we need to compare 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 under options a, b and c to its profit without proliferation, 
𝜋𝐻, as solved in Section 2.1. Specifically, 𝐻 will proliferate if  𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 >𝜋𝐻.                                                                                                           
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Lemma 3 Under Full Control, 𝐷𝑚 = 0 and 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 <𝜋𝐻 . 𝐻 has no incentive to proliferate. 
Any positive 𝑓, however small, prevents proliferation from being profitable. 
Proof. Appendix 1. 
Lemma 3 says that the market is unaffected by proliferation under Full Control: demand 
and profit allocations remain the same as in the two-quality environment. When making 
quality-price decision jointly, 𝐻 has no incentive to introduce a quality level that is different 
from the existing qualities.  
Lemma 4 Under Semi-full Control,  𝑝𝑚 → 0  and 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 <𝜋𝐻 . 𝐻  has no incentive to 
proliferate.  
Proof. Appendix 2. 
Under Semi-full Control, the profit maximizing level of 𝛽 is approaching 1. This means 
that the difference between 𝑠𝑚 and 𝑠𝑙 is infinitesimally small and the middle quality product 
in fact joins the Bertrand competition with the low quality segment. As a result, despite 
positive 𝐷𝑚, 𝜋𝑚 is zero. Again, any positive 𝑓 would lead to a decrease in 𝜋𝐻 if proliferation 
happens. 
Lemma 5 Under Independent Control,  𝛽 = 3/7 and  𝑠𝑚 = 3𝑠𝑙/7 + 4𝑠ℎ/7 . The middle 
quality product makes a positive profit.  
Proof. Appendix 2. 
The middle quality product is closer to but different from the high quality product, which 
would never be the case under the first two controls. It is intuitive that given 𝑝𝑙 = 0, 𝑠𝑚 needs 
to be sufficiently differentiated from 𝑠𝑙 in order for the middle quality product to be attractive. 
Among the three control options, Independent Control is the only option with which 
proliferation actually expands the quality configuration and the proliferated product generates 
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a positive profit. However, it remains to be checked whether proliferation can increase total 
profits.   
Lemma 6 Under Independent Control, 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 = ?̅?2𝑑/6 − 𝑓  <𝜋𝐻 .  𝐻  has no incentive to 
proliferate. 
Proof. Appendix 2. 
While 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 <𝜋𝐻 for all three control options, Independent Control is the least profitable 
for 𝐻, despite that it is the only option with which 𝜋𝑚 > 0. Table 2 puts together equilibrium 
outcomes from the two-quality environment and the Independent Control in the proliferation 
environment. Total demand in the proliferation environment is  𝜃 , so the market is fully 
covered with and without proliferation. Through the introduction of the middle quality product, 
𝐻  has successfully broadened its market segment by taking away 3𝜃/8 out of the total 
4𝜃/8  demand that the low quality product would have otherwise captured. Proliferation does 
not reduce the demand for the high quality product, but 𝑝ℎ is halved as a result, which leads 
to the fall in 𝐻’s total profits. Specifically, proliferation creates 𝜋𝑚 = ?̅?
2𝑑/48 but decreases 
𝜋ℎ from 12?̅?
2𝑑/48 to 7?̅?2𝑑/48, therefore is not desirable for 𝐻. 
Environment Price Demand Profit 
 𝒑𝒍 𝒑𝒎 𝒑𝒉 𝑫𝒍 𝑫𝒎 𝑫𝒉 𝝅𝒍 𝝅𝒎 𝝅𝒉 
Two-quality 0 - 𝜃𝑑/2 𝜃/2 - 𝜃/2 0 - 𝜃
2
𝑑/4 
Proliferation 
(IC) 
0 𝜃𝑑/14 𝜃𝑑/4 𝜃/8 7𝜃/24 7𝜃/12 0 𝜃
2
𝑑/48 7?̅?
2𝑑/48 
Table 2 Two-quality environment vs. proliferation environment with independent control  
Lemmata 3, 4 and 6 lead to Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 In the absence of threat of entry, proliferation is not profitable for 𝐻 under any 
level of control. Ceteris paribus, 𝐻 will not initiate proliferation.  
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Given that the most moderate level of proliferation of offering only one additional quality 
cannot be justified on profitability ground, Proposition 1 also implies the undesirability of 
excessive proliferation. The result suggests the stability of the principle of maximal 
differentiation in the market configuration featured in this paper. This is however, conditional 
on no entry threats. Since proliferation is also a candidate for deterrence, it may be optimal for 
𝐻 to do so when the condition is relaxed.  
 
2.3 Entry environment 
This section examines 𝐻’s incentive to proliferate in the existing two-quality market, so as to 
deter a potential entrant 𝐸. Upon entry, 𝐸 makes quality-price decision to ensure positive post-
entry surplus.  
Lemma 7 𝐸 will enter the market with products of quality 𝑠𝐸 = 3𝑠𝑙/7 + 4𝑠ℎ/7. 𝐸 sets 𝑝𝐸 =
𝜃𝑑/14 and obtains 𝜋𝐸 = ?̅?
2𝑑/48 – 𝑘, where 𝑘 ∈ [0, ?̅?2𝑑/48] is the fixed entry cost. 
Since 𝜋𝐸 > 0, 𝐸 always has an incentive to enter. The quality-price decision made by 𝐸 
is the same as that under Independent Control in the proliferation environment. This is because 
when making decisions, the independent unit maximises its own profit (and not the total profits 
of its parent-firm) just as what an entrant would do. The only difference is that 𝜋𝑚 generated 
under Independent Control contributes to the total profits of the parent-firm, 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜, whereas 
𝐸 gets to keep 𝜋𝐸 for itself.  
Suppose that given the distribution of 𝜃, it is never profitable for 𝐸 to enter with a fourth 
quality, then anticipating the quality-price decision of 𝐸, 𝐻 has an incentive to proliferate to 
deter entry if doing so is more profitable than accommodating entry, i.e., if 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 >𝜋𝐻
𝐸.                                                                                                          
Proposition 2 In the presence of threat of entry, 𝐻’s incentive towards proliferation with 
Independent Control depends on the value of proliferation cost, f, such that  
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• 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 <𝜋𝐻
𝐸 for 𝑓 ∈ (?̅?2𝑑/48,∞), proliferation is not profitable for 𝐻; 
• 𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜 >𝜋𝐻
𝐸  for 𝑓 ∈ [0, ?̅?2𝑑/48), 𝐻 has an incentive to proliferate and achieve a 
second best profit.   
Proof: When considering proliferation to deter entry, 𝐻  will choose Independent Control 
because with this control option, the proliferated product is of quality  𝑠𝑚 = 𝑠𝐸 , thus can 
restrict the market space available and make it impossible for 𝐸 to enter,7 whereas with the 
other two control options, proliferation does not change the quality configuration in the market. 
Table 3 represents firms’ profits in different environments.   
 
Environment Profit of firms 
 𝑯 𝑬 𝑳𝟏, 𝑳𝟐 
Two-Quality 12?̅?2𝑑/48 - 0 
Proliferation (IC)  8?̅?2𝑑/48 − 𝑓 0 0 
Entry 7?̅?2𝑑/48 ?̅?2𝑑/48 − 𝑘 0 
Table 3 Firms’ profits in two-quality, proliferation (IC) and entry environments 
Proposition 2 is obtained by comparing 𝐻’s profit in proliferation environment and entry 
environment. As shown in Table 3, 𝐻’s incentive to proliferate anticipating the decision of 𝐸 
depends on the magnitude of proliferation cost.  
Propositions 1 and 2 together suggest that, when  𝑓 > ?̅?2𝑑/48 , proliferation is not 
profitable for 𝐻, regardless of whether there is threat of entry. However, when 𝑓 ≤ ?̅?2𝑑/48, 
proliferation becomes optimal only if it is used as an abusive exclusionary conduct. That is, 
even the most moderate level of proliferation of introducing one additional quality may be 
anticompetitive. 
 
                                                             
7 In this paper, we focus on whether the high quality incumbent has the incentive to proliferate to deter entry. See, 
e.g., Dixit (1980) and Judd (1985) for the issue of credibility in entry deterrence. 
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3 Welfare analysis 
This section examines how consumer surplus and total welfare change when the market has 
three instead of two qualities. Consumer surplus is generated from the consumption of each 
quality. In the two-quality market, consumer surplus consists of 𝐶𝑆ℎ from consumers with 𝜃 ∈
[𝜃ℎ,?̅?]  and 𝐶𝑆𝑙 from consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃ℎ), where  
𝐶𝑆ℎ = ∫ (𝜃𝑠ℎ − 𝑝ℎ) 𝑑𝜃
𝜃
𝜃ℎ
𝐶𝑆𝑙 = ∫ (𝜃𝑠𝑙 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑑𝜃   
𝜃ℎ
𝜃𝑙
}.                                                                                                      (6) 
In the three-quality market, consumer surplus consists of 𝐶𝑆ℎ from consumers with 𝜃 ∈
[𝜃ℎ,?̅?], 𝐶𝑆𝑚 from consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑚, 𝜃ℎ) and 𝐶𝑆𝑙 from consumers with 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃𝑚), 
where       
𝐶𝑆ℎ = ∫ (𝜃𝑠ℎ − 𝑝ℎ) 𝑑𝜃
𝜃
𝜃ℎ
   
𝐶𝑆𝑚 = ∫ (𝜃𝑠𝑚 − 𝑝𝑚) 𝑑𝜃
𝜃ℎ
𝜃𝑚
𝐶𝑆𝑙 = ∫ (𝜃𝑠𝑙 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑑𝜃     
𝜃𝑚
𝜃𝑙
 
}
 
 
 
 
.                                                                                                  (7) 
Calculation. See Appendix 3. 
Summing up consumer surplus and firms’ profits, we are able to compare total welfare in 
different environments, as shown in Table 4. Since the third quality could be offered by 
proliferation or by the entrant, we include both of them for comparison. Proliferation and entry 
achieve the same consumer surplus, which is greater than the consumer surplus in the two-
quality market, whereas they both decrease industry profits. 
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Environment Welfare Comparison 
 Consumer surplus Industry profits Total welfare 
Two-quality 𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/8 + 3𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/8 𝜃
2
𝑑/4 3𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/8 + 𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/8 
Three-quality 
(Proliferation) 
119𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/288 + 91𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚
/1152 
+𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/128 − 𝜃
2
𝑑/6 
 
𝜃
2
𝑑/6 − 𝑓 
119𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/288+ 91𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚
/1152 
+𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/128 − 𝑓 
 
Three-quality 
(Entry) 
119𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/288 + 91𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚
/1152 
+𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/128 − 𝜃
2
𝑑/6 
 
𝜃
2
𝑑/6 − 𝑘 
119𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ/288+ 91𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚
/1152 
+𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙/128 − 𝑘 
                                              Table 4 Welfare comparison 
Lemma 2.7 Moving from two-quality to three-quality market, consumer surplus strictly 
increases and industry profits strictly decrease, regardless of values of f and k. 
Proof. Appendix 4. 
Following Lemma 7, whether the rise in consumer surplus outweighs the fall in producer 
surplus depends on the fixed cost upon having the middle quality product. 
Proposition 3 Moving from two-quality to three-quality market, the change in total welfare is 
such that  
• When the third quality is introduced through 𝐻’s proliferation, total welfare increases 
if and only if 𝑓 ∈ [0, (44𝑠ℎ + 91𝑠𝑚 − 135𝑠𝑙)𝜃
2
/1152); 
• When the third quality is introduced by 𝐸, total welfare increases if and only if 𝑘 ∈ [0,
(44𝑠ℎ + 91𝑠𝑚 − 135𝑠𝑙)𝜃
2
/1152). 
Proof. Appendix 4. 
When the fixed cost is smaller than the critical threshold, having the middle quality 
product is welfare-enhancing; otherwise total welfare decreases as a result of a large fall in 
industry profits. Proliferation and entry affect total welfare in the identical way if 𝑓 = 𝑘. From 
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a welfare point of view, whether the third quality should be offered by 𝐻 or 𝐸 depends on their 
relative cost of introducing it. If 𝐻 benefits from the fact that it is already established therefore 
incurs lower cost, then not only proliferation can increase welfare, it also does in a way that is 
more efficient than entry. This leads to an interesting result that, despite being an exclusionary 
conduct carried out deliberately by a dominant firm facing threat of entry, proliferation always 
benefits consumers and can even increase total welfare. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Proliferation in horizontal differentiation markets is well understood. As proliferation is 
becoming increasingly popular in vertical differentiation markets, and many vertically 
differentiated brands, especially those in the sportswear and fashion apparel industry, have 
been repeatedly engaging in joint-proliferations, e.g., H&M collaborations, it seems important 
to investigate proliferation in vertical differentiation markets. This paper provides some initial 
steps towards this goal.  
We offer an evaluation of proliferation by assessing its effects on profitability, entry 
deterrence and welfare in a simple yet intuitive framework. We highlight the trade-off between 
softening competition and broadening market segments brought about by proliferation and 
show that even the most moderate level of proliferation may be anticompetitive. Nonetheless 
when proliferation is carried out as a division that competes independently with the parent-
firm, it always benefits consumers and could even increase total welfare in a way that is more 
efficient than entry. In addition, we have extended the literature on entrant choice in duopoly 
markets following the principle of maximal differentiation by endogenously determining the 
quality level of the additional middle quality product.  
In this paper we focus on proliferation incentives of the high quality firm. The current 
framework, while useful for addressing our research interests, does not allow the low quality 
segment to play a positive role. To move closer to the real world and replicate joint-
proliferation, future research should introduce competition to the high quality segment and 
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horizontal differentiation among high quality firms and low quality firms, and assess the 
respective incentives of vertically related firms to collaborate. For example, a low quality firm 
may find it desirable to collaborate with a high quality firm so as to differentiate itself from 
other low quality firms.  
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Appendices  
1. Proof of Lemma 3  
Expand 𝐻’s optimisation problem (2), 
𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜
= 𝑝ℎ (𝜃 −
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑚
𝛽𝑑
) + 𝑝𝑚 [
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑚
𝛽𝑑
−
𝑝𝑚
(1−𝛽)𝑑
] − 𝑓.  
Derive the first order conditions with respect to 𝑝ℎ and 𝑝𝑚 
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜
𝜕𝑝ℎ
= 𝜃 −
2𝑝ℎ
𝛽𝑑
+
2𝑝𝑚
𝛽𝑑
= 0,  
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝑝𝑟𝑜
𝜕𝑝𝑚
= 
2𝑝ℎ
𝛽𝑑
−
2𝑝𝑚
𝛽𝑑
−
2𝑝𝑚
(1−𝛽)𝑑
= 0.   
The second-order conditions are fulfilled. Prices and demands  are  𝑝ℎ = ?̅?𝑑/2 and 𝑝𝑚 =
?̅?𝑑(1 − 𝛽)/2; 𝐷ℎ = ?̅?/2,  𝐷𝑚 = 0 and  𝐷𝑙 = ?̅?/2. Under Full Control, demand allocation 
stays the same as in the two-quality environment.                                                                           □                                                                                      
 
2. Proofs of Lemmata 4, 5 and 6  
We first look at independent price competition as in (4). Derive the first-order conditions 
respectively and solve for prices, demands and profits as functions of 𝛽 and ?̅? 
𝑝ℎ =  
2?̅?𝛽𝑑
3+𝛽
, 
𝑝𝑚 =
?̅?𝛽𝑑(1−𝛽)
3+𝛽
, 
𝐷ℎ =
2?̅?
3+𝛽
, 
𝐷𝑚 =
?̅?
3+𝛽
, 
𝐷𝑙 =
?̅?𝛽
3+𝛽
, 
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𝜋ℎ =
4?̅?2𝛽𝑑
(3+𝛽)2
, 
𝜋𝑚 =
?̅?2𝛽𝑑(1−𝛽)
(3+𝛽)2
, 
𝜋𝑙 = 0. 
Under Semi-full Control, 𝛽 is set by 𝐻 to maximise 𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚. We can find that, for 𝛽 ∈
(0, 1),  𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚  is increasing in  𝛽 ;  𝜕(𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚)/𝜕𝛽 = ?̅?
2𝑑(15 − 11𝛽)/(3 + 𝛽)2 > 0 . 
Hence 𝜋ℎ + 𝜋𝑚  is maximised at 𝛽 → 1. When 𝛽 → 1, 𝑠𝑚 → 𝑠𝑙 , 𝑝ℎ → ?̅?𝑑/2, which is the 
same in the two-quality environment, and 𝑝𝑚 → 0.  
Under Independent Control, 𝛽 is set to maximise the unit profit of the middle quality 
product, not total profits 
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝛽
=
(3+𝛽)2(?̅?2𝑑−2?̅?2𝛽𝑑)−2?̅?2𝛽𝑑(1−𝛽)(3+𝛽)
(3+𝛽)4
= 0. 
Solve for the above equation and 𝛽 = 3/7. The second-order conditions are fulfilled. The 
equilibrium outcomes are presented in Table 2 in Section 2.2.                                                 □                                                        
 
3. Calculation of equations (6) and (7)  
Expand and solve for (6), in the two-quality market 
𝐶𝑆ℎ =
1
2
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ − 𝜃𝑝ℎ −
1
2
𝜃ℎ
2𝑠ℎ + 𝜃ℎ𝑠ℎ =
3
8
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ −
1
4
𝜃
2
𝑑, 
𝐶𝑆𝑙 =
1
2
𝜃ℎ
2𝑠𝑙 =
1
8
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙, 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆𝑙 + 𝐶𝑆ℎ =
1
8
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
3
8
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
Expand and solve for (7), in the three-quality market 
𝐶𝑆ℎ =
1
2
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ − 𝜃𝑝ℎ −
1
2
𝜃ℎ
2𝑠ℎ + 𝜃ℎ𝑠ℎ =
119
288
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ −
7
48
𝜃
2
𝑑, 
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𝐶𝑆𝑚 =
1
2
𝜃ℎ
2𝑠𝑚 − 𝜃ℎ𝑝𝑚 −
1
2
𝜃𝑚
2𝑠𝑚 + 𝜃𝑚𝑠𝑚 =
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 −
1
48
𝜃
2
𝑑, 
𝐶𝑆𝑙 =
1
2
𝜃𝑚
2𝑠𝑙 =
1
128
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙, 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆𝑙 + 𝐶𝑆𝑚 + 𝐶𝑆ℎ =
119
288
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 +
1
128
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙 −
1
6
𝜃
2
𝑑.  
                                                                                                                                                   □ 
4. Proofs of Lemma 7 and Proposition 3  
Moving from two-quality to three-quality market, consumer surplus strictly increases if 
119
288
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 +
1
128
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙 −
1
6
𝜃
2
𝑑 >
1
8
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
3
8
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
That is, if 
140
1152
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝑠𝑚 >
231
1152
𝑠𝑙, 
which always holds since 
140
1152
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝑠𝑚 >
140
1152
𝑠𝑚 +
91
1152
𝑠𝑚, 
and  
231
1152
𝑠𝑚 >
231
1152
𝑠𝑙. 
It is straightforward to verify that, moving from two-quality to three-quality market, 
industry profits decrease. Because 1/4 > 1/6, 
1
4
𝜃
2
𝑑 >
1
6
𝜃
2
𝑑 − 𝑓, 
and 
1
4
𝜃
2
𝑑 >
1
6
𝜃
2
𝑑 − 𝑘. 
Proliferation increases total welfare if 
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119
288
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 +
1
128
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙 − 𝑓 >
3
8
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
1
8
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
That is, if 
𝑓 <
44
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 −
135
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
It is straightforward to verify that the right hand side of the above inequation is strictly 
positive. 
Likewise, entry increases total welfare if  
𝑘 <
44
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠ℎ +
91
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑚 −
135
1152
𝜃
2
𝑠𝑙. 
It follows that, total welfare is higher with proliferation than with entry if and only if  𝑓 <
𝑘.                                                                                                                                                  □ 
 
